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dug up in different phases of the
£430 million project to extract
ilmenite, a mineral which can be
used to produce titanium dioxide
pigment. Around 750,000 tonnes
of the ore will be extracted each
year at the start of the operation,
which could last 40 years.
The huge economic growth of
China has led to an enormous
demand for the white pigment,
which is used in paper, paint and
plastics, at a time when other
ilmenite mines in Australia and
South Africa are being exhausted.
Tony Juniper, head of Friends
of the Earth in the UK said: “This
is a very sad day and very bad
news for the people of
Madagascar. Rio Tinto is
exploiting natural resources in the
developing world and, once again,
it is the local people who will pay
the price.”
Rio Tinto, highly sensitive to
conservation criticisms, set up an
independent biodiversity
committee in order to assess any
likely damage and to see how
much could be avoided or
minimised. As a result, the
company decided to set aside a
conservation area on land that it
was previously going to mine, so
that some of the plants and other
species could be protected. It
also worked with experts from
Kew Gardens in London to
preserve the seeds from
threatened plants.
Amongst the gloom surrounding
mining and other developments,
there is some hope that new
projects will help people process
food products grown on the island
into quality products for the world
market. A British company has
helped set up Malagasy, a
company that sells and markets
finished chocolate bars and, in
due course, coffee, herbal teas,
honey, nuts and spices under a
system known as Equitrade. Neil
Kinsall, Malagasy’s marketing
director says: “All it would take to
end poverty in Madagascar is
£750 million a year.”
New trading arrangements are
seen as a major opportunity to
meet this goal and many believe
the alleviation of local human
poverty is one of the best chances
for the future survival of the
island’s extraordinary biodiversity.
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What is ‘theory of mind’? Maxi
eats half his chocolate bar and
puts the rest away in the kitchen
cupboard. Then he goes out to
play in the sun. Meanwhile Maxi’s
mother comes into the kitchen,
opens the cupboard and sees the
chocolate bar. She puts it in the
fridge. When Maxi comes back
into the kitchen, where will he look
for his chocolate bar? The answer
to this question will seem obvious.
First, Maxi doesn’t know that his
mother has moved the chocolate.
Second, Maxi still believes,
falsely, that his chocolate is in the
cupboard. That is why he looks in
the cupboard. If this is how you
answered the question then you
have a ‘theory of mind’. We
naturally explain people’s
behavior on the basis of their
minds: their knowledge, their
beliefs and their desires, and we
know that when there is a conflict
between belief and reality it is the
persons’ belief, not the reality that
will determine their behavior.
Explaining behavior in this way is
called ‘having a theory of mind’ or
‘having an intentional stance.’
What is the advantage of having
a theory of mind? Through
having a theory of mind we can
recognize that another person’s
knowledge is different from our
own. I know what’s behind the
rock, but he doesn’t, because,
from where he is, he cannot see
that there is a scorpion. Having a
theory of mind allows us to
manipulate other people’s
behavior by manipulating their
beliefs. If he is my friend I can
warn him about the scorpion. If he
is my enemy I can tell him it is
safe. This latter is called tactical
deception or Machiavellianism.
Human interactions predominantly
involve the dissemination of true or
false knowledge for good or for ill.
Who has a theory of mind? Up
to the age of about five years, a
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child told the story of Maxi and his
mother will say confidently that
Maxi will look for his chocolate in
the fridge. It is as if they assumed
that what they know to be true
everyone else knows too.
Nevertheless, even three-year-
olds look first at the cupboard
when the question is asked, and
even 15-month-olds can be
shown to have an inkling of what
is going on; their eye gaze pattern
shows that they are surprised if
Maxi looks in the fridge. But only
from age five or so do children
show full understanding of the
situation and become able to
explain exactly why Maxi has a
false belief. 
Children with autism have a
specific problem with theory of
mind tasks. They expect Maxi to
look for his chocolate in the
fridge. They reach a mental age of
about 10 years before they
achieve an understanding of the
Maxi task. More complex
problems that involve white lies or
double bluff take them even
longer to learn, and they may
never grasp them fully. Theory of
mind difficulties can also be
acquired through brain damage in
frontal cortex or in the region of
the temporo-parietal junction. 
From field studies there are
accounts of a range of animals
using tactical deception. But there
is still argument over whether
even chimpanzees show evidence
of this in controlled experiments.
The current view is that
chimpanzees may have a
rudimentary theory of mind, but
monkeys (and other animals)
probably do not.
What is so important about
deception and false belief in
the study of theory of mind?
Having a theory of mind enables
many important human
interactions other than deception,
in particular teaching. But
deception is important in the
study of theory of mind because
of its association with false
beliefs. If Maxi’s belief about his
chocolate were true — it was still
in the cupboard — then you can
correctly report where Maxi will
look either by basing this
prediction on what Maxi believes
(because you have a theory of
mind) or by basing this prediction
on where the chocolate really is
(not requiring having a theory of
mind). Thus, when successfully
solving false belief tasks, where
there is a conflict between the
false belief and the true state of
affairs, we can deduce that theory
of mind is engaged.
How is theory of mind
possible? In order to explain
people’s behavior on the basis of
their minds, we need to have
some idea of what is in their
minds. The ability to acquire
knowledge about other peoples’
beliefs and desires is called
‘mentalizing’ or ‘mind reading’.
Our understanding of the
mechanisms underlying this ability
remains rudimentary. In everyday
speech we frequently explain
behavior in terms of mental
states. Maxi will look in the
cupboard because that’s where
he believes his chocolate is and
because he wants to eat it. Maxi
doesn’t know the chocolate is in
the fridge. These everyday
explanations of behavior in terms
of mental states are referred to as
folk psychology. Perhaps our
ability to mentalize depends upon
representations within the brain of
the propositions that make up this
theory of behavior (referred to as
theory theory). On the other hand,
perhaps the ability to mentalize is
related to our capacity to
empathize with other people: to
put ourselves into their shoes (this
is referred to as simulation
theory). 
An influential view is that
mentalizing crucially depends on
the ability to form meta-
representations, that is,
representations that are
decoupled from reality. Thus the
truth of the statement, ‘Maxi
believes his chocolate is in the
cupboard’ does not depend upon
where the chocolate is in reality. A
possible starting point for
developing a mechanistic account
of mentalizing comes from the
problem of perspective taking.
The computation of what another
person sees from a different point
of view than yours involves
translation between egocentric
and allocentric spatial co-
ordinates. This translation is also
fundamental in spatial navigation.
It is perhaps no coincidence that
in young children the ability to
solve spatial viewpoint problems
emerges at about the same age
as the ability to solve false belief
tasks.
What is the neural basis of
mind reading? There is currently
much interest in identifying a
social brain: a circumscribed
network of brain regions
specialized for the social domain.
Mentalizing is one of a number of
problems confronting this social
brain. When brain activity is
measured during the performance
of a wide range of tasks engaging
theory of mind, two regions have
been consistently identified: a
medial prefrontal region
(paracingulate cortex) and the
temporo-parietal junction in the
superior temporal sulcus. 
The medial frontal region is also
engaged when subjects reflect
upon their own mental states, as
well as those of others with the
more inferior orbital region
responding especially to
emotional states. The temporo-
parietal junction, on the other
hand, seems to have a special
role in using perceptual cues to
recognize the actions and
intentions of biological agents.
Identification of the precise role of
these regions awaits the
development of a mechanistic
account of our remarkable ability
to make inferences about the
minds of others.
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